From the Center for European Reform, this is the CER podcast.

Hello and welcome to another episode of the CER podcast. My name is Sophia Besch. I'm a research

fellow here at the Center for European Reform, and today I'm in conversation with Constance

Stelz-Muller and Camille Grand. Constance is a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in D.C.

and Camille is Assistant Secretary General for Defense Investment at NATO.

And we're here to discuss NATO and the debate on European and U.S. defense.

We are at the Daimler U.S. European Forum.

This is another podcast on the go.

And we've just had a fascinating

two-hour debate on this issue, which we were not allowed to record. But Constance and Camille have

graciously agreed to repeat some of these points on our podcast now. So this debate about burden-sharing,

defense spending, interoperability and cooperation between NATO and the EU and between the United

States and European NATO members has been going on for decades. But what I want to talk about

is what is new, what is different today. And I would argue that there are quite a few things that are

different. If we look at Madeline Aubright's three Ds, the three no-goes of NATO Europe cooperation, no duplication, no

discrimination, and then no decoupling. They mean different things today than they meant

when she first iterated them. The no duplication, today we have EU efforts on defense

that might well duplicate some of what NATO is doing when it comes to capability planning.

No discrimination. Well, there's a risk of discrimination now against the newest NATO,

non-EU member state, the United Kingdom. And then no decoupling, I would argue that under the leadership of President Trump, but arguably even under President Obama, we've seen less of an

alignment between the US and its European allies

when it comes to strategic priorities. And I want to start with that, Camille. How big is the

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