#29: 26 July 1914 II - Better an End in Horror

When Diplomacy Fails Podcast

Zack Twamley

19th Century, 20th Century, International Relations, Politics, Thirty Years' War, Korean War, 18th Century, First World War, Phd, 17th Century, European History, History, War

4.8 • 773 Ratings

🗓️ 23 September 2024

⏱️ 37 minutes

🔗️ Recording | iTunes | RSS

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Summary

If Austria-Hungary wanted the war with Serbia, it would have to get its skates on. Europe was eagerly looking for any sign of a way out, even if Austria was not.

The British were central in pressing the need for mediation, but they knew that Germany's inclusion was key if it was to work. The Germans, it was reported, anticipated British neutrality. This was wrong, it was insisted, because Britain would tend to her interests. Even more, Britain had kept its fleet, mobilised through annual manoeuvres, intact as the crisis escalated. Did this not prove Britain's seriousness?

Whether Britain was sincere or not, it mattered less than what Austria did. By now it was widely known that Austrian armies were not marching, and if the rumours were true, and she could not march until 12 August, then that gave plenty of time for things to blow over. But before Sir Edward Grey could put the finishing touches on another Balkan conference, he first had to ensure German support, and this was proving impossible to obtain.

The German imperative of supporting Vienna in its swift Serbian war remained in play, even if Austria had not moved. Mediation would threaten this goal, and it had to be countered. Besides, reports from Russia were beginning to make Berlin nervous. Increased military preparations could ruin Germany's own strategic plans, so more information was vital. Just then it was learned that the Kaiser and his Chancellor were returning to Berlin.

Could they persuade Austria to move? If not, could they persuade her statesmen to participate in diplomatic efforts? Berlin did not want a conference, but neither she nor Austria wanted war with Russia either. Could Russia not stay in her lane and ignore the attack on Serbia, especially after all the Serbs had done? The fatalist Austrian view asserted that whatever the consequences, Serbia had to be destroyed. It might be disastrous for the Habsburgs, but as the saying went, it was better to endure an end in horror, than a horror without end.

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Transcript

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0:00.0	In summer 1914, the world went to war.
0:04.6	Now 110 years later, we go back to those figures, to those debates, to those questions,
0:12.2	in the greatest failure in the history of diplomacy.
0:16.3	I am Dr. Zach Twomley. You're listening to When Diplomacy Fails, and us also the first step towards war. Well, we will survive
1:01.0	it honourably. The army is good, at least that is what we think, and we'll do its duty. Of course,
1:06.9	it will be a difficult fight with two fronts, such as we have not ever had to such an extent.
1:13.2	Marzlinker, Chief of the Kaiser's Military Cabinet, writes to his wife, 25th of July 1914.
1:21.7	In the last episode, we saw that despite pressing its ultimatum against Serbia, Austria-Hungary was not immediately prepared for war.
1:30.4	It could not complete mobilization, Chief of Staff Conrad insisted, until the 12th of August,
1:36.3	so it could be assumed that war would not come for another fortnight at least.
1:40.5	This gave time for diplomacy to work, and the apparent pause in Vienna's march to war also suggested that this crisis could be resolved like the others.
1:49.8	We learned that the Russians were undertaking military measures and that the French were keenly aware of the importance of letting the central powers strike first.
1:58.3	Otherwise Britain would view them as the aggressors, and public opinion
2:01.7	could restrict London's options. Both in St. Petersburg and Paris, promising noises were made in the
2:07.9	direction of some form of mediated resolution. The key to preserving peace, as Sir Edward Gray and as
2:13.9	Undersecretary Sir Arthur Nicholson understood it, was to rally the four uninvolved
2:18.5	powers, replicating the kind of cooperative diplomacy that had been so effective during the Balkan
2:24.0	wars. If Germany, Britain, Italy and France could negotiate while Serbia, Russia and Austria held
2:30.7	back for military actions, the peace of Europe could be preserved.
2:34.9	Arthur Nicholson recognised that testing the waters would be an important step
2:39.2	and would require liaising with other ambassadors.
2:42.5	He saw Count Mensdorf, the Austrian ambassador to London, who announced that the relations
	...

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