#27: 25 July 1914 II - Russian to Mobilise

When Diplomacy Fails Podcast

Zack Twamley

19th Century, 20th Century, International Relations, Politics, Thirty Years' War, Korean War, 18th Century, First World War, Phd, 17th Century, European History, History, War

4.8 • 773 Ratings

🗓️ 9 September 2024

⏱️ 45 minutes

🔗️ Recording | iTunes | RSS

🧾️ Download transcript

Summary

Here we address the question - now that Austria's ultimatum to Serbia had expired, and the Austrians had evacuated Belgrade, what was Russia going to do about it?

The answer is as complicated as it is controversial. Russia's response revolved around military preparations; specifically, those preparations which would make the mobilisation of its enormous army across such a vast empire easier to carry out. These measures were called the Period Preparatory to War, and on this day, these measures were officially approved by the Tsar and his Ministers. What did this mean? Was the Period Preparatory to War simply mobilisation under a different name, or was it a reasonable response to the crisis, which merely granted Russia more diplomatic leeway?

Unsurprisingly, the answer is contentious. To some, this was the key aggravating factor which transformed the July Crisis from a regional dispute into the world war it became. To others, Russia's preparations may have been inflammatory, but they were not necessarily sinister. Should we take these measures as proof of Russia's intention to orchestrate a world war on favourable terms to themselves? Perhaps we should not go so far, but one thing is certain, by the end of the day, a line had been crossed in St Petersburg.

Once more details leaked out, Austria and Germany were bound to take notice. The question then became - would the Central Powers be scared off, or would they up the ante, seeing in Russia's behaviour yet another bluff which had to be called? Could anyone stop this game of chicken? In fact the Russians were not the only actors willing to be economical with the truth. Another was the French ambassador, Paleologue, and the Austrian Foreign Minister, Berchtold, as well as many German officials, determined to have their localised war and firm in the belief that Russia would back down.

In this episode, we wade through this soup of contradictions, poor communications, mistrust and misinformation, to arrive at some worrying conclusions. Whoever we might claim was responsible, Europe was entering the twilight period of peace, whether contemporaries wished to acknowledge it or not.

Support the July Crisis series, join the conversation, and find out more through these links:

Get bonus content on Patreon

Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Transcript

Click on a timestamp to play from that location

0:00.0	In summer 1914, the world went to war.
0:04.6	Now 110 years later, we go back to those figures, to those debates, to those questions,
0:12.2	in the greatest failure in the history of diplomacy.
0:16.3	I am Dr. Zach Twomley. You're listening to When Diplomacy Fails, and this is the July
0:23.2	Crisis. I should like to remark that here in Berlin it is generally regarded as certain that an unsatisfactory answer by Serbia will immediately be followed by our declaration of war coupled with military operations.
1:08.0	Here every delay in the beginning of military operations is seen as signifying
1:12.7	danger that other powers might interfere. We are urgently advised to proceed without delay and to place
1:18.8	the world before a fate accompli. Austrian minister to Berlin, Count Zaginni, reports to his chief
1:26.4	on the mood in the German government, 25th of July
1:29.9	1914.
1:34.6	Serbia gave its answer to the ultimatum shortly before 6pm on the 25th of July 1914. In the last
1:42.4	episode we examined the prelude to its answer and its contents,
1:46.7	but one key actor was conspicuous in its absence. Serbia would have provided a very different
1:52.4	answer had Russia signalled its inability to intervene. It was thus fortunate for Belgrade
1:58.1	that by noon on the 25th of July, telegrams reached Serbia from St. Petersburg,
2:04.2	describing the decision to begin military preparations known as the period preparatory to war.
2:11.2	With this confirmation that its benefactor planned to stand by its side, it was hardly a surprise
2:16.8	that Serbia did not capitulate to all of
2:19.1	Austria's demands. But this brings us to some other important questions. If Russian preparations for
2:25.3	war with Austria were underway, what did these preparations look like and what do they suggest
2:30.4	about contemporary responsibility for the war? Was the Tsar's government willing to fight
2:36.5	a great war in defense of Serbia, or was it assumed that Austria would back down if Russia
	...

Please login to see the full transcript.

Previous episode | Next episode

Disclaimer: The podcast and artwork embedded on this page are from Zack Twamley, and are the property of its owner and not affiliated with or endorsed by Tapesearch.

Generated transcripts are the property of Zack Twamley and are distributed freely under the Fair Use doctrine. Transcripts generated by Tapesearch are not guaranteed to be accurate.