Hey everyone, thanks for tuning in to what is

actually episode 234 of our Civil War podcast. I'm Rich and I'm Tracy. Hello y'all,

welcome to the show. Previously on the podcast we talked about how at the Battle of Fredericksburg

the Federal Offensive on the southern part of the battlefield would begin on Saturday December 13th,

1862 with vague confusing orders from Amber's Burnside to William Franklin.

Franklin, commander of the Left Grand Division, had been awake all night, waiting for the orders

to initiate the Army's main attack against Stonewall Jackson's sector of the Confederate lines.

But Franklin's already sour mood curdled even more when Burnside's imprecise somewhat mystifying

orders finally arrived that morning. Based on their conversation the night before, Franklin had

assumed Burnside wanted the Left Grand Division to deliver the Army's major assault on December

13th. But now the instructions Franklin received didn't clearly communicate that that was still the

plan. In his book on the battle George Ravel has concluded that because of the meddled orders,

quote, the force of the attack depended on Franklin's understanding and judgment,

and that general had never shown much imagination or aggressiveness. End quote.

We think Ravel's appraisal is fair, but we also think that when you're weighing up Franklin's

decision to interpret Burnside's orders in the narrowest sense, then you also need to place the

Army of the Potomac's troubled past on the scale. Yeah, you see it's one thing to fault Franklin

for not showing much imagination or aggressiveness, but it has to be pointed out that the general

who built the Army of the Potomac, George McClellan, didn't exhibit either of those qualities

to any significant degree, except in consistently wildly overestimating how many Confederates he

imagined confronted him, right? Well, but the point is this, that especially as far as lack of

aggression, it's not surprising that those commanders who were McClellan's strongest devotees,

...