1956 - The Suez Crisis #2.10: Israeli Sneaky

When Diplomacy Fails Podcast

Zack Twamley

19th Century, 20th Century, International Relations, Politics, Thirty Years' War, Korean War, 18th Century, First World War, Phd, 17th Century, European History, History, War

4.8 • 773 Ratings

🗓️ 4 April 2024

⏱️ 30 minutes

🔗️ Recording | iTunes | RSS

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Summary

1956 Episode 2.10 takes us to the Commonwealth, seen as so vital to British interests, but fracturing over the question of the best course of action to take against President Nasser.

The Canadian, Australian and NZ governments were all uneasy at the prospect of war, and some, like the Canadian Foreign Minister Lester Pearson, advocated a diplomatic approach. While Eden forged ahead with an aggressive policy, torpedoing another conference on the Suez Canal in the process, he increasingly began to alienate the Americans. The PM didn’t seem to care what other nations thought, though he was eager to make even better friends with the French throughout September. It was around this time in our story that things in France began to change – they were increasingly coming to provide weapons and support to a new ally – Israel.

Largely because of French prodding and intrigue, the Israeli element of the story became all important. While the British were not yet let in on the plan, Franco-Israeli military cooperation and supply deals were paving the way towards a more trusting, beneficial relationship which could soon be exploited. The Israeli government, led by David Ben-Gurion, was also desirous of a war with Egypt, that nation which had threatened his own with destruction time and time again. The dilemma was that Israel could not be seen as the aggressor, but how was such a war then to be crafted and set in motion? Scheming heads were set together, and before long, a solution more incredible than anyone could have imagined was brought into being…

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Transcript

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0:00.0	Come to the station, jump from the train, march at the door pulled down lovers lane.
0:15.7	Dead in the glen where the roses entwined.
0:20.1	Lay down your arms. Lay down your arms.
0:21.6	Play down your arms.
0:23.6	Lay down your arms and surrender to mine.
0:28.6	Hello and welcome history friends, Patrons Old in 1956, episode 2.10.
0:35.6	Last time we looked at some nitty gritty details, above all, how people in the
0:40.3	background in Britain were beginning to see the legal problems behind a potential military strike against Egypt.
0:46.9	If Britain acted in this way, the consensus appeared to indicate, she would not be on firm legal ground, or on the moral high ground. Despite this,
0:55.9	though, and despite the objections and clear policy put down by Eisenhower, Anthony Eden continued
1:01.7	on with his French allies regardless. In this episode, after a somewhat winding tale,
1:08.0	we're introduced to the other significant pillar of the Suez Crisis, Israel, and how it
1:13.5	fit in first with the plans of the French and then after some prodding with the plans of the British.
1:19.8	Without any further ado then, we've got a lot to cover today, so let's get right into it. We'll
1:24.8	begin first with an interesting scene as the Australian Prime Minister
1:28.8	returned home after a stormy meeting in Cairo.
1:36.0	It had been an eventful fortnight for Robert Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia since
1:45.5	1949. Menzies was a dominion leader of the old school, with a record of war service and
1:52.2	British connections to boot. He was loyal to a fault to the line taken by Britain, and he was
1:57.2	adamant that the nationalisation of the Suez Canal represented a grave indication of Nassar's insidious intentions.
2:04.2	Anyone who ignored the line put forward by Eden or who tried to rationalize Gamal Abdel Nassar's nationalization of the Suez Canal Company as purely academic,
2:13.6	ignored, in Menzies' opinion, two salient facts, and these two salient facts, in Menzies' own words,
	...

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