#17: 15-18 July 1914 - Secrecy and Haste

When Diplomacy Fails Podcast

Zack Twamley

19th Century, 20th Century, International Relations, Politics, Thirty Years' War, Korean War, 18th Century, First World War, Phd, 17th Century, European History, History, War

4.8 • 773 Ratings

🗓️ 5 August 2024

⏱️ 54 minutes

🔗️ Recording | iTunes | RSS

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Summary

With the Austro-Hungarian government on the same page at long last, it remained to follow through with the ultimatum. To Berchtold, this meant moving as quickly and as secretly as possible, so that once the ultimatum arrived in Serbia, Europe would be presented with a fait accompli. The Germans were similarly anxious, and emphasised the necessity of speed.

Still, neither Berlin nor Vienna gave much thought to the Russians. Somehow, a comfortable consensus permeated: Russia would not defend Serbia, but if she did, this was the best time to fight her. The more surprised Russia was, the more likely she was to be overtaken by events. Thanks to Berchtold's carelessness and cracked Italian codes, however, the secret did leak out. Here we examine how this happened, and what it meant for the deteriorating situation.

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Transcript

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0:00.0	In summer 1914, the world went to war.
0:04.6	Now 110 years later, we go back to those figures, to those debates, to those questions,
0:12.2	in the greatest failure in the history of diplomacy.
0:16.3	I am Dr. Zach Twomley. You're listening to When Diplomacy fails.
1:00.0	And this is the July crisis. I have often thought that things would be better if the whole truth were known. The difficulty was to tell people the truth and make them believe that they really knew the whole truth.
1:06.0	They were apt to think that there was a great deal more than they had been told. Sir Edward Gray writes to Britain's
1:13.2	ambassador to Russia 8th of July 1914. By the 14th of July, Count Leopold von Berthold had managed to achieve
1:23.2	a measure of unity in Habsburg foreign policy. With Stefan Tisa on side, Austria and Hungary would
1:30.9	now proceed with a united policy against Serbia. The plan was as bold as it was controversial.
1:37.7	Serbia would be presented with an ultimatum, demanding concessions from her government, which would
1:42.5	be plainly unacceptable if she wished to remain a sovereign state.
1:46.7	Once Serbia rejected the ultimatum, Austria-Hungary would declare war.
1:51.5	Yet, remarkably, this was the limits of the Austrian war plan.
1:56.1	Details on what would be done to Serbia, how she would be treated in the aftermath of the victorious war,
2:02.0	and critically, the question of what was to be done if Russia intervened, were all left in the air.
2:07.8	As we will see in this episode, the vagueness of the Austrian plan was one problem which left
2:13.0	the Germans deeply concerned. Another problem was the issue of secrecy. Berkdold recognized the
2:19.4	importance of leaving Europe in the dark. Should Serbia's allies in St. Petersburg discover what
2:25.2	Austria intended, they would have longer to plan their reaction and might mobilize the Entente.
2:30.9	This was believed particularly dangerous since the French president and Russian Tsar were
2:36.0	scheduled to meet in person from the 20th of July. If word reached the two allies of Austria's plans,
2:42.4	while the two allies were embracing in St. Petersburg, it could foster a sense of unity which
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